Katie N. Simpson Staff Attorney

Areas of Practice

Bar Admissions

  • Illinois

Court Admissions

  • United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
  • United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Illinois
  • United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of Illinois

Education

The John Marshall Law School, J.D., cum laude, 2011

Georgia State University, B.S., 2007

Katie Simpson is an attorney in the Financial Services Litigation Group in Dykema’s Chicago office.  Ms. Simpson has valuable experience in multiple aspects of real estate litigation including foreclosures, evictions, building code violations, liens priority issues, real estate tax disputes, receiverships, and bankruptcy matters, and other creditors’ rights matters.  In her transactional commercial real estate practice, Ms. Simpson assisted in conducting due diligence for commercial loan acquisitions and Small Business Association loans, and has negotiated and drafted commercial real estate contracts, purchase and sale agreements, work out agreements, and lease amendments.  Prior to entering private practice, Ms. Simpson was a Judicial Law Clerk for the Honorable Judge Daniel Patrick Brennan at the Circuit Court of Cook County in the Mortgage Foreclosure Section of the Chancery Division.

PNC Bank, N.A. v. Krier, 2015 IL App (3d) 140639, Will County, Illinois.  Ms. Simpson prevailed on a motion for summary judgment and judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of the Plaintiff-bank in a foreclosure action.  At the trial level, the Defendant-borrower filed no counter-affidavit refuting the bank's affidavits and documentation in support of its summary judgment motion, and the Court found there was no genuine issue of material fact, entitling Plaintiff to summary judgment.  The Defendant filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment and judgment of foreclosure ruling under 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e).  The motion to vacate was denied.  The Defendant appealed and the Third District Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding there was not error to deny his motion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure under 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e), because “section 2-1301(e) of the Code deals with default judgments entered against a party . . . .  Here, Krier was present throughout the proceedings and the court did not enter a default judgment against him.  Thus, we conclude section 2-1301(e) has no application.”  The decision was originally unpublished (PNC Bank, N.A. v. Krier, 2015 IL App (3d) 140639-U) however, Ms. Simpson successfully moved to have the opinion published on the basis that Illinois courts had previously allowed summary judgment orders to be vacated pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e), and that the Third District Appellate Court’s decision in this case should operate as precedent with regard to the application of section 5/2-1301(e) motions to vacate. 

Memberships & Involvement

  • Chicago Bar Association
  • Illinois State Bar Association
  • Real Estate Financial Forum
  • Center on Halsted – Legal Clinic Volunteer